Recent yeazs have seen a proliferation of work seeking to modify the notion of Nash equilibrium as originally defined (Nash, 1950) . There have beEn two main strands. The firet larger strand coasists of attempta to refine the notion of Nash equilibrium so as to reduce the sometimea lazge number of equilibria. Among these is the notion of perfectnesa due to Selten ( 1975) . "Trembling hand" perfectness can be viewed as an e~cpression of slight uncertainty about whether one's opponents will actually chooae their Nash atrategies. This strand culminates, perhaps, in the varioua notions of stability in which the behavior of opponents and payoffs are effectively assumed to be possibly slightly uncertain. (See Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986.) The aecond much smaller atrand relaxes the hypothesis underlying Nash equilibrium that each player's belief about an opponent be consistent with the opponent's behavior. Instead a hierarchical structure of beliefa is permitted which has the effect of enlarging the set of equilibria. ( See Pearce, 1985, and Bernheim, 1985.) The present work considers the effect of uncertainty about the informational structure of the game while retaining the asaumptions of known payoffs and rational behaviour in the usual preciae Nash sense for all playera.
The following section containa a formal treatment of this refinement procedure. It ie shown indeed that an "informationally robust equilibrium" can be defined for a general class of two-person nonzero-sum games. Furthermore it is shown that the set of informationally robust equilibria must be non-empty and a subset of the set of Nash equilibria. The mathematical tractability of the notion of an informationally robust equilibrium is a theoretical point in its favor. Such tractability would also facilitate application of the concept in contexts where the informational perturbation seema appropriate.
The conatruction of an informationally robuat equilibrium ie loosely reminiacent of "trembling hand" perfectnesa, at least with a finite number of pure atrategies. However, informational robustness does not imply perfectness. Indeed, a dominated etrategy may be used in an informationally robust equilibrium. This happens because such a strategy may be attractive to a Stackelberg leader, deapite being dominated.
It might be useful to informally analyze an example at thia point. Example A ia taken from van Damme (1983, p. 14) and is given in Figure 1 .
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The Nash equilibria, NE, here are (u,l) and (d,r) but only (u,lJ is normal form perfect. Indeed, "u" is a dominant atrategy for 1, as ia "C' for 2. However, 1 would choose "d" rather than "u", if 1 were a Stackelberg leader, given that 2 broke the resultíng tie in 1's favor. Similarly, 2 would choose "r" rather than "l" if the roles were reveraed. Suppose there were instead only a small probability that either player's pure atrategy would be revealed to the other prior to the second player's choice, with the most likely event being eimultaneous choice. Player 1, for example, must then choose one strategy taking into account the posaibility that it will be revealed to player 2 before 2's choice has to be made, as well as the likelihood of simultaneoue choice. Tbia will then turn (d,r) into a strict equilibrium of the perturbed game, roughly speaking. (Abstracting, that is, from choices made as followers. Ties should contínue to be broken as before.) Hence, although "d" and "r" are dominated in the game with aimultaneous movea, they are not dominated in a plausible informationally perturbed game.
Section 3 conaiders in greater detail the relationship between informational robustness and perfectnesa. It is shown that atrict equilibria of a game with a finite number of pure strategies are both informationaily robuat and perfect. Example B then completes the demonatration that there ia no logical relationship between the two refinements. It also showa that there may be no equilibrium which ia both informationally robuat and perfect.
Section 4 ia a review of the rather acanty literature which relates directly to the present paper.
What moral should be drawn from thia diacuasion of two-person nonzero-sum gamea with eimultaneous moves? In the case of gamee with more than two playere or with non~imultaneous moves, it was already noted that the difficulty with the present procedure is not that there ia no plauaible informational perturbation but that there are many. No attempt ia made here to analyze auch general games. However, the moral of thia paper is intended to be that the perturbation-informational, behavioral or whatever-which ahould be used for a particular game cannot be uniquely given in the abstract. To argue auch an essentially negative view, it is enough then to focus on two-peraon nonzero--sum games. Then there is a salient and mathematically tractable informational perturbation to conaider, as an alternative to the behavioral perturbation underlying períectnesa. Section 3 proves, moreover, that the asso~ated refinement is fundamentally distinct from perfectnesa. There may be no escape in the end from the need to tailor the perturbatioas considered to the context.
DEFINITION, EXISTENCE OF AN IRE
Thia section is devoted to a proof that a wide class of two-peraon nonzero-sum gamea, where moves are simultaneous, muat possess an "informationally robuat equilibrium", or IRE, for ahort. Thie clasa ia large enough to include many gamea of economic interest which have a continuum of pure strategies, Cournot duopoly for e.zample.
The clasa ia given as:
Definition 1: Simtdtaneow Move Gatna, G
A game with aimultaneous movea ia given as
where Si are the pure atrategy apaces, assumed compact metric spaces, and where Ui: Sl x S2~R i-1,2 aze continuous functiona representing the payoffs.
As usual: Thie etructure sufficea to establish exiatence of a Nash equilibrium, or NE, in mixed strategies. For each game G, as in Definition 1, a perturbed game, G(el,E2), say, is given as follows. The first move ia nature's. She selects "1" with probability el~0, "2" with probability E2~0 and "0" with probability 1-el -e2~0. If "1" is selected, player 1's choice of pure strategy ia revealed to player 2 prior to player 2's choice. Similazly, if "2" is chosen, then player 2's choice of pure strategy is revealed to player 1 prior to his choice. If "0" is chosen, no revelation takes place. In addition, player 1 cannot discriminate between states "0" and "1" and player 2 cannot discriminate between "0" and "2". The payoffs are then, eay, for i-1, 2,
where sl E Sl is the choice made by player 1 in statea "0" and "1" and fl: S2~SI is a function repreaenting the etrategy of player 1 for atate "2" when the choice of s2 E S2 ia observed. Similar definitions apply for player 2.
The construction of the perturbed game ia represented diagramatically in Figure 2 .
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
It ia desired to establish now that G(cl,f2) has an equilibrium in a suitable sense.
s To this end:
Definition .(: Btat Repliea
Define the best-reply correspondences RZ:S1~S2, R2 (81) 
De~miiion 6: Tie-Br~eaking Ruk
The tie-breaking rule is that, for example, player 2 breaka ties in favor of 1. That is, player 2 chooaes among hia best repliea one which ma~mizea player 1's payofí. A aimilar requirement holds with the roles reversed. To be precise: where the Si are as in Definition 1. That is, the payoff function U~, as in Definition 3, now dependa only on (sl,s2), and is given as: u~:S1KS2-~R,i-1,2.
Furthermore, ui is upper semicontinuous in (el,s2) and continuoua in ej, i~j, i, j-1,2.
PtooF
Since player 2 breaka ties in favor of player 1, as in Definition 8, it follows that 1's payoff in state "1" ia a function of sl only given by, say,
where this is upper aemicontinuous in sl. (Berge, 1963, p. 118 where expected payoffs are now, for i-1, 2, for all ml E Ml and m2 E M2, vi(ml,m2) -J u~(Bl,s2)dm.
Here, m-ml. m2 is the unique product measure induced by ml and m2 on S1MS2 and the upper aemicontinuity of u~implies its integrability.
(b) The game G(El,E2) hae an SPE, a6 in Definition 5.
Psooe (a) See Robaon (1990a). Lemma 1 eatabliehes the propertiee of the payoff6 needed to apply "Theorem 1". Note that Glicksburg (1952) cannot be applied here since the payoffa need not be continuous in pure atrategies.~s~s (b) It is easy to check that a suitable SPE, as in Definition 5, is (ml,m2,fl,f2) where (fl,f2) satisfy Definition 8, and where (m1,m2) is then the NE of g(El,E2) from (a).
Ramark Definition 6 is not logically needed to prove that an SPE exista. It is simply convenient to show there is an SPE with thi6 property.
Now:
Dc~nition 7: Inforn~siionsQy Robwt Equilibrnm IRE s s A atrategy pair (ml,m~) is an "informationally robuat equilibrium," or IRE, of G if and only if there exiata aome aequence of pairs (el(n),E2(n)) and an asaociated seqnence (mi,m2,fi,f2), aay, of SPEs of G(EI(n),E2(n)), aa in Definition 5, such that (el(a),EZ(n))~0 and (mi,m2)~(ml,m2), as n~m.
The main reaYlt ia then:
Theorem 9: Esiatence of IRE es Refinement ojNE s t Any game G aa in Definition 1 has a mixed atrategy pair (ml,m2) which ie an IRE, as in Definition 7. Furthermore, any IRE is also a NE of G, ae defined in Theorem 1.
PYOOF
Conaider any sequence c(n) -(El(n),e2(n))~0 aa n-. m. By Theorem 2, the game g(el(n),E2(n)), as in Lemma 1, has an NE, (mi, m2) E Ml . M2, say, for all n. Thia forms pazt of an SPE of G(El(n),e2(n)), as in Definition 5. Since Ml and M2 aze compact metrizable apaces, it follows without losa of generality that there exists a limit point of thiã s sequence of NE, (ml,m2), say, which is then sn IRE of G.
sS uppose that (ml,m2) is an IRE but is not an NE of G. This meana that, for example, t~Ṽ I(mi~m2)~Vl (ml,m2) for some mi E M1, where VI ia aa in Definition 2. Suppoae, indeed, s s r VI(mi,m2) -VI(ml,m2) -b0 1 0 By Definition 7, there exista a aequence (Fl(n),E2(n)) and a sequence (mi,mZ,fi,f2), say, of SPEa of G((el(n),e2(n)), such that (EI(n),E2(n))~~aIId (mi,m2)~(ml,m2) 8S n ti m. (mi,m2,fi,f2) be an SPE for the game G(el(n),E2(n) ). QED.
INFORMATIONAL ROBUSTNESS AND PERFECTNESS
The first result is that the requirements of informational robuetness and perfectnesa need not conflict.
Lemma t. A Sbict Eqailibrium u nn IRE
Suppose the game G, as in Definition 1, has a finite number of pure atrategies for each player. Suppoae G also has a strict equilibrium, which must then be in pure strategies. (That is, each player's Nash strategy is the unique beat reply to the other's.
This usage is as in Fudenberg, et al., 1988.) This equilibrium is then "informationally robust".
PaooF
Simply note that the atrict equilibrium of G muat be a(atrict) equilibrium of g(E1,E2), as in Lemma 1, if (El,e2) is amall enough.
Remark. Fudenberg et al (1988) observe that a atrict equilibrium is indeed "hyperstable" as a singleton set, where hyperatable is as in Kohiberg and Mertens (1986) .
The following 2M2 e~cample is then auíficient to ahow that whether an equilibrium is informationally robuat is logically independent of whether it ie perfect. It indeed ahowa that a dominated atrategy may be used in an IRE. (Example A of the introduction also showed thia in an informal way.) Hence such an IRE is a member of no "stable aet" as defined by Kohlberg and Mertens, violating their requirement of "admissibility". In addition, Example B shows that it is not possible to resolve this conflict by requiring both informational robustness and perfectness.
Example B is given in Figure 3 .
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Here, it is a dominant atrategy íor 2 to choose "r" and (u,r) is the unique normal form perfect equilibrium. However, there ia a continuum of Nash equilibria in mixed atrategies of the form {((1~~),(q,l-q))~q E f~,~1}~ so that 1 plays "u" ïor sure and 2 plays "C' with probability q. Hence the perfect equilibrium is at one end of this continuum. It will be shown that the unique IRE is at the other end of the continuum and thus is: 0),(1~2,1~2) ).
The only tie induced for the follower in either state "1" or state "2" occurs when player 1 chooses "u". However, player 1 is also then indifferent as to how this tie is brokea. The reduced form game associated with Example B is then unique and is as in Figure 4 .
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
This reduced form has unique equilibrium in mixed strategies, given by
where p is the probability that player 1 chooses "u" and q is the probability that 2 chooses "C'. Cleazly, Example B has an NE which is an IRE but not perfect, namely ((1,0) ,(1~2,1~2)), which indeed uses the dominated atrategy "C'. It also has an NE which is perfect but not an IRE, namely (( 1,0),(0,1) ), and a range of NE which are neither. Since Lemma 2 exhibits a class of NE which aze both IREs and perfect, the logical independence of the two concepts follows. Finally, Example B clearly has no equilibrium which is both informationally robust and perfect.
RELATED LITERATURE
There is little other work which considers alterations in the informationai structure of a game. Two exceptions aze noted here. Matsui ( 1989) considere a supergame in which there is a slight possibility that one 13 player's entire strategy will be disclosed to the other before the game itself is played. This is shown to imply that only Pazeto effiáent outcomes can be sustained as equilibria. There is no analogous result here. (Consider the simplest 2.2 co-ordination game, for example, with two strict Nash equilibria, where one Pazeto dominates the other. Both are then IREs.) Supergames are at once more special and more complicated than need be the case here.
More closely related is an independent informal paper by Rosenthal (1989) . He 
